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1 National Security College
governments and society are increasingly reliant 
on cyber systems. yet the more reliant we are 
upon cyber systems, the more vulnerable we are 
to serious harm should these systems be attacked 
or used in an attack. this problem of reliance and 
vulnerability is driving a concern with securing 
cyberspace. For example, a ‘cybersecurity’ team 
now forms part of the us secret service. its job is 
to respond to cyber-attacks in specific environments 
such as elevators in a building that hosts 
politically vulnerable individuals, for example, state 
representatives. Cybersecurity aims to protect cyber-
infrastructure from cyber-attacks; the concerning 
aspect of the threat from cyber-attack is the potential 
for serious harm that damage to cyber-infrastructure 
presents to resources and people. 
these types of threats to cybersecurity might simply 
target information and communication systems: 
a distributed denial of service (DDos) attack on a 
government website does not harm a website in any 
direct way, but prevents its normal use by stifling the 
ability of users to connect to the site. alternatively, 
cyber-attacks might disrupt physical devices or 
resources, such as the stuxnet virus, which caused 
the malfunction and destruction of iranian nuclear 
centrifuges. Cyber-attacks might also enhance 
activities that are enabled through cyberspace, such 
as the use of online media by extremists to recruit 
members and promote radicalisation. Cyber-attacks 
are diverse: as a result, cybersecurity requires a 
comparable diversity of approaches.
Cyber-attacks can have powerful impacts on 
people’s lives, and so—in liberal democratic societies 
at least—governments have a duty to ensure 
cybersecurity in order to protect the inhabitants 
within their own jurisdiction and, arguably, the people 
of other nations. but, as recent events following the 
revelations of edward snowden have demonstrated, 
there is a risk that the governmental pursuit of 
cybersecurity might overstep the mark and subvert 
fundamental privacy rights. popular comment 
on these episodes advocates transparency of 
government processes, yet given that cybersecurity 
risks represent major challenges to national security, 
it is unlikely that simple transparency will suffice. 
Managing the risks of cybersecurity involves 
trade-offs: between security and privacy; individual 
rights and the good of a society; and types of 
burdens placed on particular groups in order to 
protect others. these trade-offs are often ethical 
trade-offs, involving questions of how we act, 
what values we should aim to promote, and what 
means of anticipating and responding to the risks 
are reasonably—and publicly—justifiable. this 
Occasional paper (prepared for the national security 
College) provides a brief conceptual analysis of 
cybersecurity, demonstrates the relevance of 
ethics to cybersecurity and outlines various ways in 
which to approach ethical decision-making when 
responding to cyber-attacks. 
First, adam henschke argues that we need to make 
decisions regarding cyber-attacks in a reasonable 
manner. Cybersecurity challenges involve a series of 
complex relations between old and new actors and 
old and new technologies. state security agencies 
have some duties to protect themselves and civilians 
against cyber-attacks. but to ensure that these 
duties are met in a way that is publicly justifiable, 
Dr henschke argues that the decision procedures 
need to make explicit the moral values involved and 
how the state agencies make decisions between 
competing values.
F O r e W O r D
Michael Keelty
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next, nicholas evans examines the argument, 
which proponents of the ‘open culture’ movement 
advocate, that with sufficient openness we enable 
others to solve modern challenges, including 
those posed to security in the information age. 
here, Dr evans presents a series of challenges to 
this argument; he offers only the most tentative of 
solutions, but hopes to move the discourse around 
openness and security on the internet from a series 
of technical hurdles to a set of ethical concerns.
then shannon brandt Ford argues that we should 
be concerned about the use of cyberweapons 
because they have the potential to cause serious 
harm by attacking vulnerabilities in information 
systems. he demonstrates the way in which the 
distinction between ‘war’ and ‘non-war’ contexts is 
important for our understanding of the basic moral 
principles for justifying the use of cyberweapons. 
importantly, he argues, proportionate and 
discriminate responses to cyber-attacks require the 
ability to distinguish an act of cyberwar from acts of 
cybercrime and/or cyber espionage.
Fourth, adam gastineau argues that cyber-
surveillance greatly enhances a state’s power 
to restrict the privacy of individuals. he argues, 
however, that the state is only permitted to restrict 
an individual’s privacy through surveillance in cases 
where he or she can be shown to be liable to such 
restrictions. an individual’s privacy is defined by the 
amount of access that others have to that individual. 
restricting an individual’s privacy without justification 
is wrongful, he argues, because it can unjustly 
restrict an individual’s freedom. this restriction is 
only justified if one can be said to be a threat, and 
therefore liable to have their freedom restricted. 
individuals who simply pose a risk are not sufficiently 
liable to have their freedom restricted in this way.
Finally, levi West argues that cyberterrorism 
remains a contested and controversial concept, 
lacking definitional clarity. Cyberterror attacks on 
critical infrastructure offer poor return on investment 
for terrorist organisations, whose primary use 
of cyberspace remains focused on recruitment, 
radicalisation, financing and other network-sustaining 
functions. but it is possible, according to Mr West, 
to envisage future manifestations of cyberterrorism 
where data rather than people constitute the 
primary target, enabling, through the absence of 
conventional violence, more effective realisation of 
terrorists’ political or ideological goals.
A decision-making procedure for 
responding to cyber-attacks
National Security
College
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Introduction
Cybersecurity challenges involve a series of complex 
relations between old and new actors and old 
and new technologies. Furthermore, the decisions 
involved in responding or not responding to a cyber-
attack will typically involve tensions between different 
morally important values. this presents decision 
makers with a challenge: how are we to respond to 
cyber-attacks in a way that is both practicable and 
ethically justifiable? this paper presents a general 
outline for an ethically based decision procedure for 
responding to cyber-attacks.1 
Cyber-attacks can have powerful impacts on 
people’s lives, and so in liberal democratic societies, 
governments are given a special duty to protect 
their citizens, and arguably, the people of other 
nations. in short, we generally expect governments 
to act to protect the security of people. but as 
recent examples involving the us national security 
authority (nsa) and the uK global Communications 
headquarters (gChQ) have shown, there is public 
concern about what state security agencies do in 
pursuit of national security. Many potential cyber-
attacks and responses pertain to ethical trade-offs: 
security vs. privacy, individual rights vs. an overall 
public good, the placing of burdens on particular 
groups over others. the critical reasoning tools 
found in practical ethics play an essential role in 
identifying where value conflicts arise, and offer 
ways of justifying responses that help to resolve 
such conflicts.
1       this is intended to be a general outline only: any 
decision procedures for a specific cyber-attack would 
necessarily involve fine grained detail and would require 
extensive input, including – but not limited to – experts from 
computer science, security studies and applied ethics.
For example, a particular concern for securing 
cyberspace is the rise of dual-purpose infrastructure. 
Consider that something is targeted by a military 
attack. ‘[t]hat is, systems and structures for both 
civilian and military uses, or even civilian targets with 
the goal of demoralizing, weakening, or confusing an 
enemy’s military and civilian leadership’.2 the laws of 
war typically forbid the deliberate targeting of civilian 
infrastructure. but with a considerable amount of 
informational infrastructure being privately run for 
military use, or used by both military, industry and 
private actors, such discrimination between strictly 
military targets and strictly civilian targets becomes 
increasingly difficult.
Values and responses
the first aspect of a decision procedure is to 
develop a list of potential morally salient values that 
could potentially be in conflict. box 1.1 (see below) 
contains a list of key moral factors that might be 
included in an anticipatory ethical decision-making 
procedure for responding to a cyber-attack.3 any list 
of such values is necessarily incomplete, and gives 
rise to a highly complex set of interactions between 
the different elements. as with the potential cyber-
attacks themselves, the results of the interactions 
between the elements are hard to predict in advance, 
and it may be difficult to understand how they will 
play out through time.
2       randall r. Dipert, ‘the ethics of Cyberwarfare,’ 
Journal Of Military Ethics 9, no. 4 (2010): 390.
3       adapted from work by the following authors: 
thomas rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place (london: 
hurst publishers, 2013); philip brey, ‘anticipatory ethics 
for emerging technologies,’ NanoEthics 6, no. 1 (2013); 
Martin libicki, ‘Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar,’ (ranD 
Corporation, 2009).
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the purpose of such a list is to present a set of 
morally salient values that may arise when formulating 
a decision procedure to respond to cyber-attacks. 
the first step in either designing an anticipatory 
decision procedure or determining how to respond 
to a given cyber-attack is to check the decision 
procedure against the list to see which values are in 
play, and which could potentially conflict.
Box One: Key Moral Values
• Just war principles
 > response was proportional,   
 discriminate, necessary, fair and   
 not wrong in itself
• risk to life
> amount of people killed and/or   
 severity of injuries
• Critical infrastructure 
> targets of attacks 
> non-life threatening (in the short   
 term at least) but highly significant   
 impacts
• individual rights 
> Cyber incidents and responses to   
 them that violate individual’s   
 claims to:
> privacy
> property
> equality
• trust 
> loss of trust in given service   
 provider and/or system
> loss of trust in security    
 agencies/government/oversight,   
 e.g., blowback from edward   
 snowden actions
• economic costs
> Direct economic theft
> theft of intellectual property
> redesign/rebuild critical    
 infrastructure
• efficiency
> May need to sacrifice    
 efficiency for security, i.e.    
 shift from ‘just in time’    
 service delivery to systems 
 that offer a buffer, i.e. designing in   
 system resilience, ‘high availability’
> raise consumer costs
> basic annoyance i.e. constant   
 password resets
• international relations 
> strain on diplomatic relations   
 between nation states: saudi   
 arabian/israeli relations following   
 0x Omar data thefts, 2012. 
• national security 
> trade individual rights for    
 increased national security
> require clarity on meaning     
 of national security, i.e., is it   
 maximised social good or private   
 economic interest?
> need to specify which    
 rights are traded against national   
 security, whose, and for how long.
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General responses to cyber-attacks
the next step is to design a given set of responses. 
What a general ethical model can do is to postulate 
an ‘if X, then y’ approach. given the input of X, we 
anticipate the outcomes of y, and then compare 
across different potential outcomes to assess which 
course of response is most ethically sound. by 
‘general’, this methodology is intended to be neutral 
with regard to the particular ethical system being 
applied – it is agnostic with regard to favouring a 
particular style of consequentialism, deontology or 
other. the key aspect here is to make clear which 
set of values are guiding the decision making. the 
following is a description of reasoning from variable 
inputs, and then two visual models of the same set 
of reasoning. 
if X cyber-risk will likely cause small economic harm, 
then responding must not cause more economic 
harm (taking into account short-term and long-term 
economic costs) 
anD
if y responder (police investigation) has best capacity 
to respond to small economic harm,
then y (police investigation) should be the responder
but
if X cyber-risk will likely cause significant harm to 
critical infrastructure
then identify responder with capacity: Military/private
if military response has high moral hazard of acting/
medium moral hazard of not acting 
anD
if the private response has medium moral hazard of 
acting/medium moral hazard of not acting, then the 
private response is most justified (all other things 
being equal).
Following Martin libicki’s position that one should 
differentiate between minimal impacts/economic 
impacts and high severity impacts on critical 
infrastructure,4 i offer the following two models of 
response.
4       ‘Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar.’
4       ‘Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar.’
Figure 1: General response matrix to non-critical/economic harms
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note that these are models only: they are deliberately 
simplified representations of methods of responding. 
they are not intended to replace the fine-grained and 
dynamic reasoning discussed throughout this paper. 
this point needs to be heavily emphasised, as there 
is a danger in simply applying this model, especially 
in conditions where there is uncertainty or limited 
time. such models are suggested simplifications 
intended to provide a general indication of how 
ethical reasoning with relation to cybersecurity can 
operate in practice.
second, to prescribed courses of action; the 
first matrix involves a cyber-attack on non-critical 
infrastructure, while the second involves a cyber-
attack of high or severe impact or a circumstance 
that could impact critical infrastructure. as described 
earlier, one of the key elements of any effective 
cybersecurity program is the capacity to identify 
reliably the target and impact of a given cyber-attack. 
Despite fears of a cyber-armageddon,5 such an 
event has not occurred so far.6 the point here is that 
we have typically encountered cyber-attacks that 
would be located in the first matrix. this is not to say 
that disasters cannot occur, but rather to point out 
that it is only the events in the second matrix that will 
typically require a major trade-off between key ethical 
values. Furthermore, if critical infrastructures can be 
designed such that cyber-attacks are likely to fall 
within the first matrix, then many of the challenging 
ethical decisions regarding cybersecurity can 
hopefully be avoided. 
5       richard a. Clarke and robert K. Knake, Cyber War: The Next 
Threat to National Security and What to Do About It, (harper Collins 
e-books, 2010).
6       rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place.
 
 
Figure 2: General response matrix to critical infrastructure/high impact attacks 
Note that these are models only: they are deliberately simplified representations of methods of 
responding. They are not intended to replace the fine-grained and dynamic reasoning discussed 
throughout this paper. This point needs to be heavily emphasised, as there is a danger in simply 
applying this mo el, e pecially in conditions wher  th re is uncertai ty or limited time. Such 
models are suggested simplifications intended to provide a general indication of how ethical 
reasoning with relation to cybersecurity can operate in practice. 
Second, to prescribed courses of action; the first matrix involves a cyber-attack on non-critical 
infrastructure, while the sec nd involves a cyber-attack of high or sever  impact or a circumstance 
that could impact critical infrastructure. As described earlier, one of the key elements of any 
effective cybersecurity program is the capacity to identify reliably the target and impact of a given 
cyber-attack. D spite f ars of a cyber-Armageddon,5 such an event has not occurred so far.6 The 
point here is that we have typically encountered cyber-attacks that would be located in the first 
matrix. This is not to say that disasters cannot occur, but rather to point out that it is only the 
vents i  the second atrix th t will typically require a major trade-off between key ethic l value . 
Furthermore, if critical infrastructures can be designed such that cyber-attacks are likely to fall 
within the first matrix, then many of the challenging ethical decisions regarding cybersecurity can 
hopefully be avoided.  
In respect to the colour-coding, the models have been deliberately kept simple, with moral hazards 
given three potential ratings: green = low, orange = moderate and red = severe. If the set of 
potential outcomes includes all red and one green, then – absent significant extrinsic factors – the 
green option is the most favourable. Although any decision-making procedure must involve far 
more detail than that contained in these models, the point here is to illustrate what role ethical 
analysis can play in a given scenario. There is practical value to involving ethics in cyber-security, 
                                                            
5 Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It, 
(Harper Collins e‐Books, 2010). 
6 Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place. 
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in respect to the colour-coding, the models 
have been deliberately kept simple, with moral 
hazards given three potential ratings: green = low, 
orange = moderate and red = severe. if the set of 
potential outcomes includes all red and one green, 
then—absent significant extrinsic factors—the 
green option is the most favourable. although any 
decision-making procedure must involve far more 
detail than that contained in these models, the point 
here is to illustrate what role ethical analysis can 
play in a given scenario. there is practical value to 
involving ethics in cyber-security, in a way that is 
central and foundational to decision making, rather 
than a patch or supplement at the end. as such, 
developing any decision procedures would need to 
involve consistent and high-quality ethical analysis 
such that the models do not replace effective 
decision procedures. 
in this example, if X cyber-risk is likely to cause 
considerable harm to critical infrastructure, or have 
severe impacts on individuals, the second matrix 
is engaged. in the second matrix two courses of 
action have been identified—a military response 
and a private response. to spell out what this 
means, the comparison is between a military 
response, i.e., use of cyber-weapons and/or 
physical violence such as putting ‘a missile down 
one of your smokestacks,’7 and a private response, 
for example, a ‘stand-your-ground’ approach.8 
again, this comparison is a deliberate simplification 
that highlights how comparisons can be made 
between different options. the two options, military 
and private, have been rated by reference to (a) 
immediate impacts, (b) moral hazards of acting/
not acting, and (c) severity/impact—orange being 
moderate impact, red being severe. in situations of 
comparison, one can see that the impact of military 
action is severe, while that of private response is 
moderate. On this, it seems that private response is 
7       this is a reference to a pentagon official who made the 
now-famous statement in a Wall Street Journal article, ‘if you shut 
down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of 
your smokestacks’, siobhan gorman and Julian e. barnes, ‘Cyber 
Combat: act of War,’ The Wall Street Journal, 31 May 2011.
8       patrick lin, ‘‘stand your Cyberground’ law: a novel proposal 
for Digital security,’ The Atlantic, 30 april 2013.
desirable to the military, but allowing private citizens 
to act might lead to escalation. 
such responses need integration. that is, what has 
been listed here is a simplified set of government 
agencies; military, police, security/intelligence, 
other government agency, and private actor(s). 
the ‘if X, then y’ decision framework and resulting 
matrices imply coordination between government 
agencies and simplify these agencies to clusters 
such as ‘military’. the reality of government is far 
more complex. the military, for example, is a highly 
complex institution comprising many different 
groups, sub-groups and actors. Consequently, 
what is necessary for effective cybersecurity is a 
coordinated level of integration and harmonisation 
between these agencies, perhaps overseen by a 
specific department such as the australian Cyber 
security Centre (aCsC). it might be that the chief 
organising department shifts over time, as it has 
done in the past,9 but my point is that coordinated, 
integrated and harmonised responses are necessary 
for effective cybersecurity.
Developing long-term strategies for 
cybersecurity
in order to ensure a robust capacity to respond to 
cyber-attacks, i suggest that an integrated cyber-
operations centre have the capacity to:
• identify relevant agencies with capacity and 
mandate to respond
• identify and recognise a given threat
• work within a clear chain of command
• identify moral hazards of acting/not acting in the 
short and long term.
9         peter Jennings and tobias Feakin, ‘special report – the 
emerging agenda for Cybersecurity,’ (Canberra: australian strategic 
policy institute, 2013).
as part of a long-term strategy for cybersecurity, 
personnel also need effective education. this relates 
both to personnel working within the responsible 
agencies (including the people likely to become 
personnel) and the general public. such education is 
essential. social engineering involves cyber-attackers 
targeting humans as key points of vulnerability in 
a cybersecurity system. some claim that up to 70 
per cent of successful cybersecurity attacks involve 
social engineering.10 One example involves leaving 
infected usb sticks on the ground outside a given 
agency or institution with the intention that staff 
pick up the infected usb stick and plug it into the 
institution’s computers, thus potentially infecting 
the computer network and bypassing the air-gap. 
education of staff and the public at large can go 
some way to reducing these sorts of vulnerabilities.
some countries, such as the netherlands, have 
proposed laws such that institutions have a duty 
to report cyber-attack incidents.11 the motivation 
behind the duty to report is that all will benefit from 
the disclosure and sharing of cyber-incidents. a 
duty to report is a prime example of designing 
robustness into a system. but a key concern about 
a duty to report is that if a company is required to 
declare publicly its vulnerabilities and failures in its 
cybersecurity, then consumers and shareholders will 
flee the company, potentially causing the company to 
go bankrupt, as the incidents affecting the company 
Diginotar demonstrate.12 this is not an imagined 
scenario—public knowledge of cybersecurity failures 
has had highly negative impacts on given companies. 
Furthermore, the loss of public trust in a company 
with the aim of driving it out of business could in fact 
be the intended aim of the given cyber-incident. any 
duty to report mechanisms must be carefully and 
thoughtfully designed.
10       Mark bowden, Worm: The First Digital World War (new york: 
atlantic Monthly press, 2011).
11       government of the netherlands, ‘new legislation on the 
Duty to report and possibilities for intervening in the event of Digital 
security incidents,’ government Of the netherlands, 
http://www.government.nl/news/2012/07/06/new-legislation-on-
the-duty-to-report-and-possibilities-for-intervening-in-the-event-of-
digital-security-incidents.html.
12       rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place, 26–30.
With this in mind, the particular attributes of a duty 
to report would have to include who is reporting to 
whom, when, what the content of the report would 
require, which relevant industry actors should be 
alerted to the given incident, and just how such 
reports should be made public. a possible model 
here is in civil aviation, where the aviation industry 
has mandatory reporting requirements13 but has 
systems in place that allow for in-confidence 
reporting. this means that all actors in the aviation 
industry benefit, those who have suffered incidents 
do not unjustifiably suffer, and the public retains trust 
in the system as a whole.
Conclusion: actions and reasons for 
acting
as the fallout from the leaks by edward snowden 
has shown, people around the world are now taking 
an interest in what states are doing in pursuit of 
national security. an important lesson to be learned 
from the snowden revelations is that a reference 
to ‘national security’ alone is not sufficient to justify 
the actions of national security agencies. Making 
the values underpinning decision procedures more 
apparent is one way of ensuring that cybersecurity is 
not only achievable but also deemed acceptable to a 
state’s citizens. the ethical decision-making process 
offered here can, hopefully, help formulate such a set 
of procedures.
13       Civil aviation safety authority, ‘safety information policy 
statement,’ australian government, http://www.casa.gov.au/scripts/
nc.dll?WCMs:stanDarD:1001:pc=pC_101466.
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Introduction
two features1 of modern cyberspace present a 
serious challenge for cybersecurity:
Distribution: information and communications 
technologies (iCts) are most productive when 
ubiquitous2  
Deskilling: the development of cyberspace has 
seen a proliferation of skill and access, enabling a 
larger number of people to command relatively large 
amounts of power in cyberspace.3 
Distribution and deskilling create a security challenge 
by lowering the costs—material, experiential, and 
opportunity—of the malevolent use of technology. 
Committing acts ranging from minor vandalism to 
large-scale economic or physical harm is becoming 
ever more possible.4 We are approaching a crisis 
point at which the cost of committing cybercrime5—
in terms of technical and economic barriers—is very 
low; however, the consequences of individual acts 
can be quite large. 
1       these features are not exhaustive of issues in cybersecurity; 
they are, however, significant challenges.
2       Weber, steven, The Success of Open Source. harvard 
university press, 2005; hope, Janet, Biobazaar: the open source 
revolution and biotechnology, Cambridge, Ma: harvard university 
press, 2008; Carlson, robert, ‘the pace and proliferation of 
biological technologies,’ Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense 
Strategy, Practice, and Science, 1 (3), 2003, 203–214. though this 
productivity is not always a good thing, see e.g., goodman, M. 
‘a vision of crimes in the future,’ Technology, Entertainment, and 
Design (TED) Global, June 2012 http://www.ted.com/talks/marc_
goodman_a_vision_of_crimes_in_the_future.html (accessed 6 July 
2013). the subject of when innovation or productivity is truly good 
is for another paper currently under development, but it seems 
clear (and indeed that paper is motivated from the intuition) that not 
everything productive or innovative is indeed good.
3       De Joode, ruben van Wendel, Understanding Open Source 
Communities: An Organizational Perspective. Doctor of philosophy, 
tu Delft, Delft, ne, 2005.
4       arquilla, John, ‘twenty years of Cyberwar,’ Journal of Military 
Ethics 12:1, 2013, 80–87.
5       Or cyberterrorism, though perhaps not (yet) cyberwar. i won’t 
offer a comprehensive analysis of these terms and distinctions 
between them; the token i use for malevolent acts in cyberspace is 
cybercrime.
Dual-use and open access
this problem is neither new nor unique to iCts, 
but finds expression in a number of contemporary 
problems of ‘dual-use,’ whereby one and the same 
technology or set of technologies can be used for 
good or evil.6  as the cost of genomic sequencing 
– and increasingly, synthesis – falls, we encounter 
the widespread proliferation of accessible, powerful 
biotechnology.7 likewise, the ability to produce, 
modify, and even wrest control of drones is already 
in the public domain.8 Convergent technologies 
such as 3D printing could further this convergence 
of ease of access, use, and modification.9 
each field has its risks, and iCts present these 
risks in the most obvious fashion by virtue of the 
field’s maturity. in point of fact, biotechnology is 
still very much considered science, while drones 
both find considerable research promise as well as 
an emerging market presence. iCts are certainly 
the subject of research, but are also a mature, 
ubiquitous, and relatively well-functioning collection 
of technologies.
6       evans, nicholas g., ‘great expectations – ethics, avian flu 
and the value of progress,’ Journal of Medical Ethics 39: 4, 2013, 
209–13.
7       hope, Biobazaar.
8       Carlson, robert, ‘are these the Drones We’re looking For? 
(part iV)’ 11 October 2012 http://www.synthesis.cc/2012/10/
are-these-the-drones-were-looking-for-part-iv.html (accessed 28 
november 2013)
9        the ‘Drone it yourself’ project is an open-source, 3D printable 
drone platform that can use any regular object as a drone body. see 
http://jaspervanloenen.com/diy/ (accessed 28 november 2013).
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Assessing the risks
a comprehensive account of the current risks is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but a brief survey 
of recent events will demonstrate the type and 
pervasiveness of existing threats. stuxnet, the 
worm that infected siemens systems worldwide, 
but “mysteriously” only attacked and damaged 
iranian nuclear centrifuges in 2010, is of course the 
paradigm of cyberwar.10 in July of 2013, an english 
court ruled that Flavio garcia, a researcher at the 
university of birmingham, be banned from publishing 
his research on cracking the security systems of 
luxury cars; Volkswagen applied for an injunction 
against garcia based on the security implications 
of his work.11 While talking about cars, it should be 
noted that in 2010, collaboration between university 
of California san Diego and university of Washington 
showed that car software could be hacked, and 
malicious code embedded through most any system 
in a car, including the CD player.12  similarly, the Food 
and Drug administration has warned that medical 
devices can be hacked.13 gps satellites are also at 
risk: tyler nighswander’s team from Carnegie Mellon 
university showed that 20–30 per cent of the global 
Continuously Operating reference stations could be 
rendered inoperable via malicious gps broadcasts 
using about $2,500 worth of equipment.14 
10       lucas, george, ‘Jus in silico: Moral restrictions on the use 
of Cyberwarfare,’ in allhoff, evans, and henschke, The Routledge 
Handbook of Ethics and War, routledge, 2013.
11       O’Carroll, lisa, ‘scientist banned from revealing codes used 
to start luxury cars,’ The Guardian, 27 July 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jul/26/scientist-
banned-revealing-codes-cars (accessed 27 november 2013).
12       Koscher, Karl et al., experimental security analysis of a Modern 
automobile IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 2010.
13       us Food and Drug administration, ‘FDa safety 
Communication: Cybersecurity for Medical Devices and hospital 
networks,’ 13 June 2013 http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/safety/
alertsandnotices/ucm356423.htm (accessed 27 november 2013).
14       nighswander, tyler, ledvina, brent, Diamond, Jonathan, 
brumley, robert, brumley, David, ‘gps software attacks,’ CCs 
’12 October 16-18, 2012, raleigh, nC http://users.ece.cmu.
edu/~dbrumley/courses/18487-f12/readings/nov28_gps.pdf 
(accessed 28 november 2013).
everything and everyone is vulnerable, and the 
technical solutions to guard against such vulnerability 
can often be complex.15 the more secure the 
system, the higher the barrier to penetration—but 
few systems are overly secure. researchers recently 
discovered a critical vulnerability in the android 
phone operating system that allowed attackers to 
inject malicious code into legitimate programs—and 
they identified instances ‘in the wild’ of attackers 
doing just that.16 
these represent some emerging security issues 
in civilian devices; however, the majority of 
cybercrime—which costs hundreds of billions of 
dollars per year17—is performed through endemic 
but uncontroversial exploitation of computer 
systems around the world. in terms of individual 
losses, compromised critical infrastructure may 
be catastrophic. however, the current state of 
cybercrime is one that represents a massive loss 
distributed over a panoply of relatively minor losses. 
importantly, a great deal of this crime is centralised 
through organised crime gangs, who have moved 
into the online world for its lack of accountability 
and enforcement.18  
15       goodin, Dan, ‘no easy way to stop breaCh from plucking 
secrets from https pages, feds say’ 3 august 2013,
 http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/08/no-easy-way-to-
stop-breach-from-plucking-secrets-from-https-pages-feds-say/ 
(accessed 28 november, 2013).
16       goodin, Dan, ‘First malicious apps to exploit critical android 
bug found in the wild,’ 24 July 2013, http://arstechnica.com/
security/2013/07/first-malicious-apps-to-exploit-critical-android-
bug-found-in-the-wild/ (accessed 28 november 2013).
17       For a good summary of the range of difficulties in estimating 
the costs of cybercrime, and some preliminary estimates, see 
anderson et al., ‘Measuring the Costs of Cybercrime,’ 11th 
Workshop on the Economics of Information Security, (berlin, July 
26 2012).
18       McCusker, rob, ‘transnational organised cyber crime: 
distinguishing threat from reality,’ Crime, Law and Social Change, 
46:4-5, 2006, pp.257-273. see also Williams, philip ‘Organized 
Crime and Cybercrime: synergies, trends, and responses,’ Global 
Issues 6:2, 2001, 22-26.
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if crime is the threat, the true challenge arises in 
what one does about such widespread, accessible, 
distributed skill in a vulnerable environment. by 
virtue of their structure, distributed and deskilled 
endeavours are resistant to ‘preventative’ 
strategies—regulation, export controls, licensing 
and prohibition.19 Distributed, deskilled communities 
have the ability to circumvent security strategies 
with ease—something we see in everything from the 
theft of 100 million sOny playstation accounts, to 
lulzsec, to the arab spring.
prevention strategies are problematic, it is claimed, 
because they drive away talent; restrict access to 
materials, opportunities, and skills; and limit the 
freedom to innovate. they also routinely fail to 
protect individuals from harm: hampering beneficial 
innovation while failing to prevent misuse is the 
hallmark of failed regulation.20 
instead, proponents of distributed and deskilled 
cultures call for ‘preparation’ strategies: incentivising 
rapid, beneficial innovation combined—in some 
cases—with comprehensive technology monitoring. 
in very simplistic terms, preparation strategies create 
conditions in which the progress of those securing 
our good outpaces those who mean us harm.
The problem of regulation
preparation is claimed to surpass prevention. 
prevention is too sluggish for the environment on 
which it acts: it doesn’t always fail, but it fails too 
frequently, or is too costly, to be a satisfactory 
solution. it is claimed that preparation is the 
superior strategy because it incentivises beneficial 
development—a desired end regardless of 
approaches—without spending on costly and 
ineffective regulation.
19       Carlson, robert, Biology is Technology: The Promise, Peril, 
and New Business of Engineering Life, Cambridge, Ma: harvard 
university press, 2010.
20       Carlson, Biology is Technology.
yet preparation rests on the assumption that 
the “good guys” can be meaningfully faster than 
the “bad guys,” and thus be a strategy that 
succeeds against other contenders. this is a highly 
problematic claim and i offer a series of concerns 
with holding such an assumption.
First: numbers. how do we ensure that there are 
enough good guys relative to bad guys to achieve 
sufficient security? the good guys need to cover 
all or most of their bases—bad guys only need to 
hit one target. this is a manpower issue: does an 
open system like the one described in the prevention 
strategy have the right incentives to attract people to 
solving security issues?
the answer, i think, is no. a typical response to 
the problem of malfunction or malfeasance in open 
systems is that that ‘many eyes make all bugs 
shallow.’ Distribution and deskilling increase the 
number of good guys, by virtue of leaving problems 
open for the largest possible number of people to 
work on.
this problem is larger still because bugs are 
not vulnerabilities.21 bugs are typically parts of 
a system that, when used, cause disruption in 
normal functioning. Vulnerabilities, however, do 
not present as disruptions in normal functioning 
up until the point that they are exploited. We need, 
then, enough good guys who are knowledgeable 
and relevantly incentivised to find vulnerabilities, 
and enough individuals that can shore those 
vulnerabilities up once they are found.
21       laurie, b. (2005). ‘Open source and security’. in C. Dibona, 
D. Cooper & M. stone (eds.), Open Sources 2.0: The Continuing 
Evolution (pp. 57–71). sebastopol, Ca: O’rielly.
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second, relying on preparation makes certain 
assumptions about the uptake of information in 
an open system—namely, that it is comprehensive 
enough to penetrate society and secure the number 
of people (as above) with the amount of skill we 
need. but this is not assured as a matter of what 
it means for a system to be open in the way that 
distributed and deskilled communities are open. 
the whole point is to provide information, but that 
is not the same as education. huge numbers of 
individuals use open-source software—56 per cent 
of the web server market is held by the open-source 
organisation the apache software Foundation.22  
yet the population of individuals with the skill to fix 
bugs, much less to repair security vulnerabilities, 
is surely very small in comparison.23 Developers 
may be recalcitrant or reluctant to adopt security 
measures. software may not be designed with 
security in mind. and the security risks keep on 
evolving—faster than people can keep up.24 
third and finally is the problem of what i will 
call ‘parasitic malevolence.’ innovation in open 
communities, it seems, runs into the problem that 
even though secrecy is an unstable strategy,25 
it can limit information uptake to accelerate a 
security program sufficiently. in distributed, deskilled 
communities, we assume that for each innovation 
we make, that malevolent individuals cannot easily 
piggyback off our efforts. the degree to which this 
holds is in part the degree to which preparation 
strategies can succeed.
22       hope, Biobazaar.
23       laurie, ‘Open source and security.’
24       bright, peter, ‘Crypto experts issue a call to arms to avert 
the cryptopocalypse,’ 2 august 2013, http://arstechnica.com/
security/2013/08/crytpo-experts-issue-a-call-to-arms-to-avert-the-
cryptopocalypse/ (accessed 28 november 2013).
25       schneier, bruce. securing Medical research: a 
Cybersecurity point of View. Science, 336:6088, 2012, 1527-1529.
if part of our preparation strategy is to innovate along 
the lines of securing cyberspace, then perhaps this 
will work. but if the preponderance of innovation 
is directed towards new, unsecured endeavours 
in cyberspace—particularly when connected back 
to other important services, as in the case of Mat 
honan of Wired magazine, whose amazon account 
was hacked, and then daisy-chained into his 
apple iD, gmail and twitter accounts. the hackers 
eventually locked honan out of his computer and 
then wiped it clean—it is worth noting that the 
hackers used a customer service line to gain access 
to his iCloud account.26 
Conclusion: how to proceed
Can the assumptions on which the preparation 
strategy is based be borne out, and if so, to what 
degree? if the answer is ‘yes,’ so much the better—
particularly if preparation is low cost. but if not, or if 
successful preparation comes at a very high cost, 
this is a serious concern. it of course does not mean 
that the preparation strategy is a write off: it may still 
be our best option. but it should give us pause.
this is not merely a technical problem: it is a 
combination of technical and ethical conflicts. 
preparation can lead to rapid innovation, but the rate 
of uptake of that innovation can vary greatly.27 early 
adopters and the highly educated benefit immensely, 
while the benefits to others decrease in proportion 
with their ability to use the technology, and to be 
integrated into the dynamics of the resultant culture.
26       honan, Mat, ‘how apple and amazon security Flaws led to 
My epic hacking,’ Wired 8 June 2013 
http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2012/08/apple-amazon-mat-
honan-hacking/ (accessed 28 november 2013).
27       evans, ‘great expectations’
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if we rely on prevention only, we appear to be 
doomed to watch as open culture on the internet 
‘routes around’ damage. We drive away otherwise 
benevolent innovation while doing nothing to protect 
individuals from harm. We may even exacerbate the 
damage by causing more unrest—the harm caused 
by revelations of prisM is yet to be seen, but already 
constitute a public relations disaster.
if we follow through with preparation, the concerns 
i raise need to be addressed. rapid innovation 
requires empowering a great number of individuals 
to identify weaknesses: this is a coordination issue 
that has its own trade-offs. letting the status quo 
remain is likely to result in a dearth of experts, but 
there are risks involved in creating security experts in 
terms of oversight and corruption. a society of skilled 
experts in iCt vulnerabilities must be accountable 
for their role in larger society, and when engaged in 
the highest levels of security, problems emerge. One 
form this corruption could take is the misuse of such 
an organisation by the state; the other form is that of 
individual corruption of members of that organisation, 
tempted to use their skills for more profitable ends.
educating a populace is no doubt a good thing, 
but is a politically volatile subject in a number of 
jurisdictions. Moreover, allowing security needs to 
influence education would be, i suspect, unpalatable 
to many. it is also potentially time-consuming, costly, 
and high-risk. ultimately, if individuals can limit their 
own vulnerability and be inured to the social aspects 
of cybercrime (eg, phishing) then there is less to 
worry about. but how much this would cost, and 
how to do this while preserving education in a range 
of other areas is a hugely complex question.
We will also need to educate law enforcement on 
a more distributed level, so that state and federal 
and international agencies can better react against 
cybercrime. as cybercrime becomes more distributed, 
and affects a greater number of devices (e.g., medical 
devices, vehicles etc.), we require greater know-how 
across the board. in societies in which policing is 
underfunded or neglected by the political process, or 
in which policing forces do not have the trust of their 
communities, this is incredibly problematic.
these are all, however, fixes that leverage the 
background institutions on which our society, and 
our use of technology, rest. the degree to which we 
are willing to allow preparation to proceed should 
be a function of our trust in these institutions, and 
of the degree to which we are willing to trade off the 
benefits preparation brings against other valuable 
goods. if our institutions fail us and we reach too far, 
the costs could be very high indeed.
Finally, parasitic malevolence provides a serious 
challenge to preparation. the seemingly obvious 
solution is community engagement, but this has 
had mixed results for reasons i’ve mentioned 
regarding trust in law enforcement. surveillance can 
be problematic without community participation 
or consent, even if only in terms of backlash when 
surveillance is revealed.28 however, the cultures 
about which we are talking are often divided about 
how to relate to problems of security and the 
function of the state in promoting security. this is a 
larger ethical issue that i cannot develop here, but 
which must also be tackled.
at the end of the day, preparation may be better that 
prevention. but in order to show that is the case with 
any degree of confidence, we need to know what 
we are promoting, what that trades off against, and 
whether that comprises an acceptable set of risks to 
take among an increasingly broad sector of society 
(i.e., internet users). When we begin comparing and 
trading off values we enter the domain of ethics; this 
suggests to me that mere technological innovation 
cannot be preparation enough—preparation must be 
designed with ethics in mind. 
28       http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-
secret-program-online-data
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Introduction
Cybersecurity is an increasingly prominent feature of 
the national security agenda. national governments 
are alarmed at the potential for serious attacks on 
cybersecurity and are responding accordingly. the 
australian government, for instance, nominated 
‘malicious cyber activity’ as one of seven key 
national security risks in the 2013 australian 
national security strategy.1 given such an emphasis 
on cybersecurity, and the significant investment 
governments are making in this area, clearly it is an 
important task to establish a firm conceptual grasp 
on what we mean by the term. after all, it appears 
that cybersecurity is being used in a very broad 
sense to capture everything that is happening in 
the cyber domain. in this sense, cybersecurity is 
‘an ill-defined catch-all for the nuanced problems 
of a tech-rich, hyper-networked world.’2 Certainly, 
cybersecurity encompasses a range of conceptual 
axes: private and public infrastructure; threats 
against information or harms to or through physical 
devices. but cybersecurity can also be used in a 
more specific sense as protecting national cyber-
infrastructure from threats to its reliability. For 
the purposes of this paper, cybersecurity is the 
protection of cyber-infrastructure from cyber-attacks.
1       aCg. ‘strong and secure: a strategy for australia’s national 
security.’ Canberra: australian Commonwealth government, 2013.
2      Joshua, Kopstein, ‘‘Cybersecurity’: how Do you protect 
something you Can’t Define?’ the Verge, 
http://www.theverge.com/policy/2012/8/22/3258061/defining-
cybersecurity-fud-cispa-privacy.
Cyberweapons
in this first section, i discuss the threat to 
national cybersecurity in terms of the use of 
‘cyberweapons.’ Cyberweapons are software 
programs designed to attack and damage other 
software (or data within computer systems) with 
the intention of doing harm. in this, i follow neil 
rowe’s (2010) definition of a cyberweapon in which 
he argues that cyberweapons are software used 
to attack other software or data within computer 
systems.3 implicit in rowe’s definition comprises 
the idea that cyberweapons, by virtue of being an 
attack on software, are attempting to damage the 
targeted software in some way.
Cyberweapons might damage software in a 
variety of ways. a cyberweapon might infiltrate—
or inject—unwanted data into an information 
processing system that alters the database. it might 
also interfere with intended ways of processing 
that data, such as is the case with malware, and 
there are also cases in which the information flow 
within an information system is blocked, and the 
degradation or otherwise modification of that flow.4
but cyberweapons are designed to do more 
than simply damage software. attacks using 
cyberweapons are ‘intentional attacks’ that are 
instigated or controlled by individuals, political 
organisations—or their military services—with 
the intention of harming other persons, political 
organisations or military services.5 so the purpose 
of a cyberweapon is to attack an information 
system in order to perpetrate harm. stuxnet is 
frequently cited as a paradigmatic example of a 
cyberweapon. Discovered in June 2010, stuxnet is 
a computer worm specifically designed to attack, 
and physically damage, iran’s nuclear facilities.
3       neil C rowe, ‘the ethics of cyberweapons in warfare,’ 
International Journal of Technoethics 1, no. 1 (2010): 21.
4       randall r. Dipert, ‘Other-than-internet (Oti) Cyberwarfare: 
Challenges for ethics, law, and policy,’ Journal of Military Ethics 12, 
no. 1 (2013): 41.
5       randall r. Dipert, ‘the ethics of Cyberwarfare,’ Journal of 
Military Ethics 9, no. 4 (2010): 398.
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Cyberweapons pose a number of unique 
challenges for thinking about the ethics of conflict. 
First of all, it is difficult to determine the source of 
an attack using a cyberweapon. the ‘attribution’ 
problem, as it is described, is the difficulty of 
identifying the source of a cyber attack with 
sufficient certainty to respond. to be morally 
justified in using a forceful response—especially 
one that causes significant harm to another 
party—a necessary condition is that the defender 
knows the alleged attacker intended to cause 
harm in some way. yet the necessary components 
of cyberweapons—ie, a laptop and an internet 
connection—are readily available to most people. 
expert actors operating from cyberspace do not 
need significant institutional support potentially 
to inflict significant amounts of damage on 
national information networks or infrastructure. 
so attributing an attack from a cyberweapon to a 
specific party is notoriously difficult. 
a second challenge of cyberweapons is the 
possibility that they will lower the threshold for 
conflict between states. the perception that 
cyberweapons are not seriously harmful could 
lead to their increased use and potentially instigate 
more serious forms of conflict. it might prove that 
many of these threats are not that serious, but the 
ever-increasing reliance on cyber systems means 
that cyber-attacks on software can damage critical 
infrastructure and threaten the lives of people. 
third, cyberweapons increase the likelihood of 
civilians being targeted and/or becoming victims of 
disproportionate attacks on joint-use infrastructure. 
the problem here is that the distinction between 
joint-use and civilian information systems is much 
less meaningful when the military use of civilian 
cyber-infrastructure is ubiquitous.
The war context
next i demonstrate the way in which the 
permissibility of using cyberweapons—or responding 
to an attack from a cyberweapon—is determined by 
context. My starting point is the presumption that the 
use of a cyberweapon should be morally justified. in 
this, i agree with the view that, 
cyber conflict, just as any form 
of armed conflict or use of force, 
should only be prosecuted for a 
compelling and justifiable reason, 
and only after all reasonable 
attempts short of these normally-
prohibited measures have been 
attempted without success. We 
would, moreover, reasonably expect 
ourselves and others engaging in 
this form of conflict … to do so 
only if the ends sought bore some 
reasonable relationship to the harm 
and destruction we might otherwise 
inflict in an effort to resolve the given 
conflict in our favour.6 
the basis for this justification, according to lucas, 
is meeting the Just War principles of proportionality, 
discrimination and last resort. in other words, 
one must prove, first of all, that the use of the 
cyberweapon is necessary in some way. second, 
the use of a cyberweapon should be discriminating 
in that it is correctly targeted against its intended 
object. third, the use of a cyberweapon should be 
proportionate, in that it does the least amount of 
harm to achieve its purpose.
6       george r. lucas Jr, ‘Jus in silico: Moral restrictions on the 
use of Cyberwarfare,’ in Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War: 
Just War Theory in the 21st Century, ed. Fritz allhoff, nicholas g. 
evans and adam henschke (taylor & Francis, 2013), 20.
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so what does this mean in practice? let me 
attempt to demonstrate using a hypothetical 
example. let us imagine that the attacking country 
launches an unjustified serious cyber-attack 
on a defending country. this attack attempts 
to damage the defending country’s critical 
infrastructure (e.g., electricity grid, air traffic control 
systems) in a way that will seriously harm the 
inhabitants of the defending country. in this case, 
a plausible approach to the permissibility of using 
cyberweapons might run along the following lines: 
Necessity: the defending country’s use of 
cyberweapons against the attacker is justified as 
necessary because it is acting in self-defence, 
either to halt the attack or to deter the attacker 
from further hostilities. 
Discrimination: the defender might not have 
conclusive evidence of the attacking country’s 
complicity in the attack, but the seriousness of the 
threat gives the defender a high-level of leeway in 
what it targets.
Proportionality: likewise, the context of the 
situation allows the defender to inflict a significant 
amount of harm in response to the attack.
this is what is conventionally described as a ‘war’ 
context. the conventional war context presupposes 
that a damaging act inflicted with the intention 
of harm is part of a larger struggle between two 
or more political communities engaged in armed 
conflict. that is, the incident is classifiable as an 
armed conflict and part of a war-fighting effort. this 
means that the decision to use—or refrain from 
using—force occurs within, and must be judged in 
terms of, an environment vastly different to what we 
would expect within a non-war context. 
Non-war contexts
now let us turn to discuss non-war contexts. in 
most cases, the threats found in cyberspace are 
more mundane than ruining critical infrastructure 
or hijacking drones. Most cyber-attacks are best 
described as cybercrime. these include: spam 
rings, extortion, money laundering and other 
organised criminal activity. For these threats, law 
enforcement is the more appropriate context for 
conceptualising cybersecurity; and this involves 
different actors with different reach, jurisdictional 
boundaries and purposes. 
the conventional law enforcement context describes 
an environment where a sovereign state—or similar 
political community—is reasonably effective at 
managing violent conflict within its own jurisdiction 
using a common body of law. it presupposes at least 
a basic form of government with a functioning law-
making body, criminal justice system and policing 
institutions. it also requires the absence of serious 
armed conflict, especially recurring violent incidents 
between large politically motivated groups. Within 
the law enforcement context, belligerents who are 
party to a conflict are treated as suspected criminals 
and not as combatants. 
the conventional understanding of violent conflict 
within the law enforcement context assumes three 
basic environmental—or contextual—conditions. 
First, the conflict is a domestic rather than an 
international issue. this means that any given 
state is responsible for resolving a violent conflict 
that occurs within its own jurisdiction. second, it 
is generally assumed that the parties to a violent 
conflict are non-state actors and the role of the 
state is to adjudicate fairly between them. third, the 
incident is not classifiable as an armed conflict or 
part of a war-fighting effort.
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having briefly highlighted the war context and the 
law enforcement context, there is also the sometimes 
discussed murky world of cyber espionage. 
according to Dipert,7  attacks in this realm include, 
“traditional counterespionage and disinformation 
campaigns, old-fashioned destruction of telephone 
lines, jamming of radio signals, killing of carrier 
pigeons, and so on.” he goes on to suggest that 
espionage is not usually an activity that has been 
considered part of the moral considerations in regard 
to conventional conceptions of Just War theory, 
and that the ethical considerations in espionage and 
other intelligence-gathering operations are but one of 
the several traditionally neglected aspects within the 
morality of conflict.8  
let us consider a second example to illustrate 
the point that our interpretation of the basic moral 
principles for using cyberweapons should look 
considerably different in non-war contexts. imagine 
a second example in which a group working from 
the attacking country steals sensitive information 
from the defending country, but with little or no 
damage to the defender’s cyber infrastructure 
and no threat to the inhabitants of the defending 
country. in contrast to the first example,
Necessity: perhaps it is possible that the defender 
is justified in using a cyberweapon in this case, 
but it would require some other key factor. For 
example, the attacker might be stealing sensitive 
information as part of its preparation for a military 
attack on the defender. 
Discrimination: even if the use of a cyberweapon 
is somehow justified, we would require more 
stringent proof as to the identity of the perpetrators. 
Proportionality: We would also want the harm to 
be strictly localised to the target in question.
7       randall r. Dipert, ‘the ethics of Cyberwarfare,’ Journal of 
Military Ethics 9, no. 4 (2010): 386.
8       randall r. Dipert, ‘the ethics of Cyberwarfare,’ Journal of 
Military Ethics 9, no. 4 (2010): 389.
Conclusion: the war-fighting 
distinction
in conclusion, the point of this exercise is to 
demonstrate the importance of what i refer to as 
the ‘war-fighting’ distinction for determining the 
application of moral principles in conflict. the 
war-fighting distinction states that designating a 
context as ‘war’ alters the way in which we should 
interpret the basic moral principles for justifying 
the use of cyberweapons, or responding to being 
attacked by a cyberweapon. in this case, there is 
an important moral distinction to be made between 
attacks using a cyberweapon and one that is 
designed for the purposes of cyber exploitation. 
and the reason for the importance in accurately 
describing cyber-attacks is because “there is always 
a risk of escalating a case of espionage or crime to 
international armed conflict.”9 
in other words, we do not want states overreacting 
to cyber-attacks. the key mistake here is to 
conflate the threat from a cyber-weapon with one 
that involves ‘cyber exploitation.’ there are non-
damaging cyber-attacks that aim to exploit an 
information system without causing harm. examples 
include: 1) theft of information, both state-sponsored 
and criminal; 2) creating unauthorised access 
to a system; or 3) attempts to take control of an 
information system. the important point here, so 
the reasoning goes, is that we should acknowledge 
an important distinction between attacks using 
cyber-weapons, which, as i have argued, aim 
to harm infrastructure and persons, and cyber-
exploitation, which involves a non-damaging 
attack on cyber-infrastructure, and then respond 
accordingly. Consequently, the permissibility of using 
cyberweapons in response to a cyber-attack is 
contingent upon the context of the threat. 
9       panayotis a yannakogeorgos. ‘Keep Cyberwar narrow.’ The 
National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/keep-
cyberwar-narrow-8459.
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Introduction
as with any type of surveillance, the challenge for 
security services is to balance the need to detect and 
interdict threats to the community against the rights 
of the community that they are meant to protect. 
Cyber-surveillance grants security services great 
power in both collecting and collating information, 
allowing state agents to form highly detailed profiles 
of individuals or groups by using a wide range of 
sources of digital information. however, as the recent 
controversy with the us national security agency 
has revealed, states cannot expect to have carte 
blanche in the use of such technology. the central 
claim of this section is that policing activities in the 
cyber sphere can prove to be as great an issue 
of moral concern to a population, particularly the 
populations of liberal democracies, as the activities 
of those seeking to undermine the state or actively 
attempting to harm the populace. as technology 
increases our ability to access each other’s lives, 
we become more capable of affecting, directly 
or indirectly, the actions of others. insofar as we 
hold certain political goods (e.g., freedom) and 
personal goods (e.g., autonomy or individual liberty) 
to be valuable, we have reason to ensure that this 
increased power granted to the state to conduct 
general surveillance of its populace is carefully 
regulated. Failing to do so would allow for large-scale 
privacy violations, and with these violations large-
scale ethical violations against those living within 
such societies.1
this paper will proceed as follows: First i provide 
a brief overview of what exactly i mean when 
discussing ‘Cyber’ (or ‘Cyberspace’) and Cyber-
surveillance. second, i outline the ostensibly neutral 
definition of privacy given by ruth gavison. this 
definition defines privacy as being an issue of 
accessibility rather than one of control, and i offer 
a brief summary of the reasons behind this. next i 
briefly examine why we might think that restrictions 
of privacy are ethically problematic. Finally, i apply 
this analysis to the issue of cyber-surveillance to 
1       references to ‘just’ or ‘unjust’ refer to ethical, not necessarily 
legal justification. such claims may or may not also apply to legal 
justifications. as such something maybe permitted by law but not 
ethically ‘just’ by this analysis.
argue that societies that claim to value freedom and 
individual rights should place strong restrictions on 
the use of such technology by the state. i then briefly 
outline what these restrictions might look like, and 
explain when the state might be ethically justified in 
using such technology. 
Cyber-surveillance and privacy
before discussing privacy, some account of ‘cyber-
surveillance’ is necessary. some current cases 
include: surveillance of populations via network-
enabled devices, such as travel information gleaned 
from ‘smart cards’ by Victorian police2 and the 
nsa, using large amounts of data from major 
internet providers to identify and track particular 
targets; and the possible use of drones by law 
enforcement agencies to collect evidence for use in 
later prosecutions. the term ‘cyber’ or ‘cyberspace’ 
has not yet been formally defined, though there is 
some general agreement in the literature. One might 
traditionally define ‘cyberspace’ as the existing set 
of interdependent, networked communications and 
information technology systems. such systems 
include the internet and all that is associated with 
it, incorporating online social networking sites, 
e-mail, phones, sMs/text, and gps. also included 
are systems that provide services facilitated by the 
internet and other similar networks. these public 
cyber systems include transport key cards or 
‘e-tags’ that track a user’s activity on various public 
transit systems or roadways, and charge the user’s 
account accordingly. also included in this set would 
be commonly used security tools such as CCtV 
cameras and license plate/traffic cameras. such 
systems collect a very narrow set of data, which is 
then indexed and stored. 
2       thomas hunter, ‘Myki is Watching you: smartcard Operator 
gives police access to Customer info’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 
(2010)., neil rees, et al., ‘surveillance in public places’, (Victorian 
law reform Commission, 2010), 180.
When these narrow data sets are combined and 
used in conjunction with other cyber systems, 
however, they can be used effectively to monitor 
individuals. by collating these various narrow data 
streams one can determine movement patterns, 
identify vehicles or other forms of transport 
commonly used, and other habits. Cyber technology 
allows one to create a comprehensive picture of an 
individual and their habits in a relatively short time. 
it is not my intention here to go into any great detail 
on the various debates that have sprung up in the 
privacy literature. nonetheless, a concept of privacy 
in some form is necessary for the discussion. Certain 
assumptions will be made, but these should not have 
a great effect on the claims i wish to make regarding 
the limits to be placed on police powers in liberal 
democracies. though the divergent views inherent in 
the varying conceptions of privacy may be at odds 
with one another, given a neutral approach to privacy, 
the conclusions drawn should remain the same.
ruth gavison has offered what she terms a ‘neutral’ 
definition of privacy.3 this definition seeks to outline 
the characteristics of the term without exploring why 
privacy neutrality of terminology might be valuable. 
as such, it is primarily a functional description of 
what we are talking about when we consider privacy, 
and in particular violations of privacy. gavison points 
out that when we are discussing issues of privacy 
we are referring to our ‘accessibility to others’ 
and she breaks this accessibility into three main 
categories: information/secrecy, attention/anonymity, 
and access/physical access. 
First, ‘information’ is precisely that: data about 
ourselves. the greater access one has to data about 
an individual, the greater the reduction in privacy. 
if i have access to information about an individual i 
may use that data to forecast behaviour, track the 
individual, or gain access to additional data, such 
as accessing bank records or e-mail accounts. in 
gaining information about an individual, i gain access 
to them as an individual even if i never actually 
interfere with them at all. 
3       ruth gavison, ‘privacy and the limits of law,’ The Yale Law 
Journal 89, no. 3 (1980).
second, gavison splits ‘attention’ into two sub-
categories. One may think about an aspect of a 
particular individual. For example, i might think 
about what tony abbott is likely to do on his days 
off; what kind of beer he most likely drinks; where 
he goes; who he may see, and so on. gavison 
argues that my paying this kind of attention to tony 
abbott does not violate his privacy, since this sort of 
speculation, on its own, gives me no real access to 
him. but there is another type of attention that one 
might pay to an individual, which would constitute 
an invasion of their privacy. this is what i will call 
‘actualised’ attention. this kind of attention is not 
merely focusing one’s thoughts on an individual 
and speculating about them, but actually watching, 
tracking, or otherwise monitoring an individual as 
they go about their daily lives. 
Finally, gavison points out that one considers one’s 
privacy to be violated when an agent is able to gain 
‘physical access’ to us without our consent. by 
physical access gavison means that one is able to 
place themselves in close enough physical proximity 
to an individual that they are able to observe that 
individual by means of their regular senses. For 
example, a ‘peeping tom’ who stations themselves 
outside an individual’s windows to watch them 
undress violates the individual’s privacy in this way. 
these three characteristics are interrelated, but 
conceptually independent of one another. i might 
gather information on an individual without ever 
focusing my attention on the individual themselves 
or being in close physical proximity to them. 
likewise, i might observe an individual closely, 
staring at someone at the next table in a café, 
without acquiring any further information about them. 
Finally, peeping toms may restrict another’s privacy 
by positioning themselves outside the window, as 
in doing so they give themselves physical access 
to that individual without the individual’s permission 
even if the individual is not yet in the room. in many 
cases, however, these three characteristics of 
accessibility are interrelated and feed one another.
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The value of privacy4 
privacy is valuable for at least three reasons. First, 
privacy acts as a restraint against the state dominating 
its citizens, thus protecting citizens’ freedom from 
state power. second, having a sphere of privacy, 
wherein no one can gain access to me without some 
justification, reinforces my status as an autonomous 
individual. third, insofar as this sphere of privacy is 
important to me as an autonomous individual, one 
has a strong claim that it not be violated without 
sufficient justification. all three of these claims about 
privacy are extensively discussed in the ethical 
literature on the subject. in the interests of space i will 
only address the first of these reasons here. 
4       For accounts discussing the importance of privacy to the 
autonomous individual, see Jeffrey h. reiman, ‘privacy, intimacy, 
and personhood,’ Philosophy & Public Affairs 6, no. 1 (1976); 
Joseph Kupfer, ‘privacy, autonomy, and self-Concept,’ American 
Philosophical Quarterly 24, no. 1 (1987). For accounts discussing 
privacy as a right, see the following: Judith Jarvis thomson, ‘the 
right to privacy,’ Philosophy & Public Affairs 4, no. 4 (1975); 
thomas scanlon, ‘thomson on privacy,’ ibid; thomas nagel, 
‘personal rights and public space,’ ibid.24, no. 2 (1995).
philip pettit formulates a concept of freedom5 on the 
difference in power between agents. pettit suggests 
that freedom is a sort of ‘anti-power.’ in order for an 
individual to be free, others must not have the power 
to dominate that individual. One is dominant over 
another if, and only if, one has an actual capacity to 
interfere with the dominated individual, can do so 
without penalty, loss, or chance of the subjugated 
individual asserting themselves in response, and can 
do so within a certain sphere of choice.6 
pettit’s account maintains that provided these three 
conditions are met, it is irrelevant if the dominating 
party chooses to interfere with the subject or not. 
the mere fact that the dominator could do so is 
sufficient to support the claim that the subjugated 
agent is not free. pettit has also pointed out that this 
anti-power, or lack of dominance, must be robust if it 
is to constitute freedom. if one might be dominated 
at one point in time, but not another, based on the 
whim of the potential dominator, then one is not 
actually free. in short, if there is a ‘door-keeper’ on 
which one’s ‘freedom’ is contingent, then one is 
not in fact free. liberal democracies that stress the 
importance of freedom must therefore ensure that 
the policies and legislation they pursue preserve 
this freedom by preventing the state dominating the 
individual in this way.7 
5       there are many accounts in ethical literature and political 
theory of what exactly constitutes ‘freedom’. this is only one of 
these accounts. For other accounts of freedom as non-interference 
see thomas hobbes, Leviathan (1651); J.s. Mill, On liberty (Oxford: 
Oxford university press, 1991); and, more recently, robert e. 
goodin and Frank Jackson, ‘Freedom from Fear,’ Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 35, no. 3 (2007).
6       ‘…(1) has the capacity to interfere (2) with impunity and at 
will (3) in certain choices that the other is in a position to make.’ 
pettit includes manipulation as a form of interference. philip pettit, 
‘Freedom as antipower,’ Ethics 106, no. 3 (1996).
7       phillip pettit, ‘the instability of Freedom as noninterference: 
the Case of isaiah berlin,’ Ethics 121, no. 4 (2011).
Privacy as Accessibility
For example, take a standard case of a 
stalker. the stalker notices the individual in 
a café, and watches the individual closely, 
following them as they leave and walk to a 
particular address. using this information the 
stalker obtains information about the person 
who lives or works at this address, accessing 
their Facebook account or tracking them 
through social networks and monitoring their 
movements online. Finally the stalker adopts 
a position from which to observe their subject 
without their knowledge, placing themselves 
outside their target’s window when they know 
the target to be elsewhere in order to watch 
them when they return. here one can see 
how actualised attention garners information, 
which allows for further actualised attention—
more information—and finally physical access 
to the individual targeted.
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Implications for police surveillance
Cyber-systems increase the capability for an 
agent or agency to gain access to individuals. in 
some cases, as with drones or security cameras, 
such technologies may make it easier to focus 
our attention on an individual or group we wish to 
monitor. however, these technologies help us in other 
ways as well. nissenbaum8 has pointed out that 
data gleaned from focusing our attention is sporadic 
and disjointed, and therefore difficult to analyse in 
many ways. this is no longer the case when drones 
and other cyber technologies are used, particularly 
when used in tandem with information obtained from 
monitoring other cyber systems such as meta-data, 
smart cards, and e-tags. these technologies allow us 
to connect small pieces of information to one another 
and collate them into a comprehensive picture of an 
individual, allowing us greater ability to interfere with 
that individual as they go about their daily lives, and 
thereby reduce their freedom.
think back to our stalker case and substitute a 
police officer, or other state agent, for the stalker. 
you are sitting peaceably in a café when you notice a 
uniformed police officer watching you, staring at you. 
this might be mildly disturbing, but not catastrophic. 
now imagine that as you leave you notice the officer 
following you to your car. as you drive off you notice 
a police car behind you in traffic, which stays there 
until you arrive at your destination. at various times 
during the next week you notice police driving by, 
or officers watching and perhaps following you 
when in public. so far we have only addressed one 
aspect in which privacy might be violated: attention. 
now imagine you discover that the government 
has gained access to various pieces of data such 
as those mentioned above, and is using that data 
to further focus its attention on and gain physical 
access to you. this data might be meta-data logging 
the location and time of phone calls you have 
made or e-mails that you have sent, who received 
them and when. such data might also include your 
browsing history on the internet or membership of 
certain online forums. perhaps, you discover that 
the police have gained access to smart-card records 
8       helen nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, 
and the Integrity of Social Life, (stanford university press, 2009).
kept by the public transport systems that record the 
stops at which cards are used on public transport, or 
have tracked the times and dates you have passed 
certain toll stations. all of these fall into the second 
aspect of privacy above: access to information. 
Finally, let us incorporate the third aspect of privacy: 
physical access. One day, after several weeks 
of being watched you arrive home. you’ve not 
been followed, but sitting across the street from 
your house is an official-looking car with a suited 
individual in the front seat. later that evening you 
notice the same individual standing outside your 
house watching you as you move around inside 
your home. such a situation would likely make one 
particularly uncomfortable and would certainly affect 
the decisions one might make. One might avoid 
certain neighbourhoods or groups that one believes 
to be considered dangerous by the state whether 
you believed them to be dangerous or not. One 
might not engage in certain activities that are legally 
or socially unacceptable, even if only trivially so. 
For example, one might pay much more attention 
to one’s speedometer to observe the speed limit, 
and might not visit bars in a red-light district or in 
gathering places for those with ideas that ran against 
the social norm. 
this scenario demonstrates how state surveillance, 
without the restrictions suggested here, could 
reasonably result in changes to an individual’s 
behaviour due to state surveillance that amount 
to domination by the state and so a violation of 
their liberty. this is not to say that surveillance is 
never permissible. such restrictions seem perfectly 
reasonable if one has chosen to act in a way that 
designates them as a threat to others, by choosing 
to speed while driving for example, or choosing to 
behave recklessly in public. however, insofar as 
such surveillance targets individuals who have not 
chosen to engage in such behaviour, it violates their 
privacy, and insofar as such violations affects the 
choices they might permissibly make, it restricts their 
freedom without justification. 
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to highlight a case of particular concern, members 
of ethnic or religious groups that are considered to 
be risky in some sense by the state may be less 
likely to engage in activities considered permissible 
for other groups: choosing not to attend political, 
religious, or social events they would otherwise wish 
to attend because they fear that doing so will expose 
them to greater invasions of privacy or open them 
to other forms of state interference. presuming that 
one has no choice in membership in such groups, 
these individuals are not liable to state surveillance, 
or accompanying restrictions in freedom, because 
they themselves have yet to demonstrate that they 
are a threat. 
in cases where there is some choice, as in 
association with specific religious institutions or social 
organisations or clubs, some surveillance may be 
permitted of these institutions, organisations or clubs. 
however, further surveillance of individual members 
may or may not be permissible. those who have 
chosen to behave as a threat as defined above are 
liable and therefore targetable because of this choice, 
but according to the analysis presented here, those 
who cannot be shown to have made such a choice 
are not subject to such surveillance as it violates their 
privacy and thereby unjustly restricts their freedom. 
police surveillance is greatly enhanced by advances 
in technology. however such advances are only as 
valuable as long as they are used to preserve those 
values, like liberty, that are held to be most important 
in society. When they are used in a way that damage 
such values, regulation is necessary to maximise the 
benefit of these advances for all. 
insofar as one gains access to another, one restricts 
their privacy. insofar as we restrict their privacy, we 
restrict their freedom. but surely this is not always a 
bad thing. there are plenty of cases in which such 
reductions of freedom might be permissible. how 
then do we determine which privacy restrictions are 
permissible and which are not? in cases where the 
target being monitored is acting, or perhaps has 
recently acted, in a way that makes them liable to be 
so monitored, then the individual loses their claim, to 
some extent, to privacy and must bear the requisite 
loss of freedom that results.
how then do we determine who is liable and who is 
not? here i turn to a recent ranD europe report on 
cybersecurity, which seems to offer a solution.9 in 
this report ranD analysts offer a distinction between 
risks and threats. risks are a function of possible 
threats multiplied by vulnerability to such threats, 
multiplied by the severity of the possible outcome 
should the threats eventuate. threats, on the 
other hand, consist in a ‘motivated adversary who 
exercises choice.’ risks then are general in scope, 
whereas threats, in contrast, require a specific 
‘adversary’ that behaves in a certain way. because 
threats constitute wilfully acting in an ‘adversarial’ 
manner, they pose a greater risk of harm, and so 
are liable to have their privacy violated, and freedom 
restricted, by security surveillance in proportion 
to the threat they pose. to clarify this last point 
somewhat consider the following example: all else 
being equal, a person carrying a firearm constitutes 
some risk to others. however, when the individual 
wilfully acts in an ‘adversarial’ manner, by drawing 
the weapon and pointing it at some other agent, 
or indicates some motivation to harm by leaving 
the weapon holstered while verbally threatening 
others with harm, or perhaps even just shouting 
aggressively at others while gripping the weapon 
or displaying the weapon in its holster, it seems 
reasonable to say that the individual poses a greater 
risk of harm: a threat.10 the individual becomes liable 
to have greater restrictions placed on their freedom, 
such as being subject to surveillance by the state, 
for at least as long as such behaviour is manifest, 
because they choose to behave in this fashion. risks 
on the other hand, are not liable to be so restricted, 
precisely because they lack the active motivation and 
choice necessary to become liable. in short, while 
they might become a threat sometime in the future, 
they are not yet a threat and so are not permissible 
targets for state surveillance. this then makes any 
such surveillance a violation of their privacy, thereby 
unjustly restricting their freedom.
9       neil robinson et al., ‘Cyber-security threat Characterisation: a 
rapid Comparative analysis,’ ed. ranD europe, Cambridge, uK, 2013.
10       Of course there may be some disagreement about when 
the risk posed by an individual agent is sufficiently elevated for that 
individual to be considered a threat. however, it is sufficient for 
the discussion here to give some idea about how one should go 
about drawing the line, even if space requirements do not allow for 
argument about precisely where that line should be drawn.
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Conclusion: restraining police 
surveillance
this analysis rules out giving police and other state 
security agencies broad access to data pertaining 
to those living within the state. it also requires that 
some sort of third-party evaluation is necessary in 
cases where the police believe a threat to exist, 
to ensure that the target of that surveillance is not 
merely an individual or group posing a risk, but rather 
one that constitutes a threat to the community. 
this evaluation currently takes the form of judicial 
review of such cases, with a warrant, or similar legal 
mandate required before surveillance is undertaken. 
it seems to me that these precedents should be 
applied to police use of ‘cyber-surveillance’ as well. 
as cyber technologies advance, however, such 
restrictions and oversight must take into account 
the increased capability these technologies offer to 
invade the privacy of individuals, as states that claim 
to value freedom cannot morally restrict the freedom 
of their citizens without good cause.
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Introduction
the conceptualisation of cyberterrorism is by 
its inherent nature contested, opaque and, at 
times, wilfully inaccurate. engaging in a structured 
analytical process that seeks to establish some 
degree of conceptual clarity in regards to this 
concept is essential so as to ensure that public 
policy responses and broader security discourse 
in relation to cyberterrorism remain proportionate 
and necessary and, crucially, effective. this 
paper identifies the dominant approaches to the 
concept of cyberterrorism and highlights some of 
their key shortcomings. Further to this, the paper 
hypothesises actions and behaviours that could 
accurately be described as cyberterrorism, and 
through use of alternatively proposed language 
suitably depict malicious behaviour occurring in or 
through cyberspace. by drawing on central works 
in relation to the definition of both ‘cyber’ and 
‘terrorism’, this paper seeks to identify potential 
new sites for ideologically motivated activity that 
targets and/or leverages cyberspace. in doing so, 
it is hoped that emergent activities and possible 
future incidents may be conceptualised in a more 
accurate, moderate and informed manner, ensuring 
appropriate responses.
First of all, it is necessary to address the definitional 
problems in the term ‘cyberterrorism’. as many 
scholars of terrorism and political violence readily 
acknowledge,1 there is no universally accepted 
definition of terrorism, either in legal, policy or 
conceptual terms. schmid states in the introduction 
to his chapter on defining terrorism that: 
1       see schmid, a.p. (2012). ‘the revised academic consensus 
definition of terrorism’. Perspectives on Terrorism, 6(2), 158-159. 
available: http://terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/
schmid-terrorism-definition; Weinberg, l., pedahzur, a. & hirsch-
hoefler, s. (2004). ‘the Challenge of Conceptualizing terrorism‘, 
Terrorism and Political Violence, 16(4), 777-794’. available at: http://
dx.doi.org/10.1080/095465590899768; ganor, b. (2002). Defining 
terrorism: is one man’s terrorist another man’s freedom fighter? 
Police Practice & Research: An International Journal, 3(4), 287-304. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1561426022000032060
there are hundreds of definitions of 
terrorism in use …. they emphasize 
a variety of attributes of terrorism 
…. yet such a listing of frequent and 
similar elements of terrorism is in itself 
not a definition.2 
the challenge that this presents for analysing 
cyberterrorism is substantial in that it presents a 
contested concept—‘terrorism’—and merges it with 
the emergent, contested, and ill-defined term ‘cyber’. 
this permits the term to be used to refer to incidents 
that have little or no correlation to terrorism in either 
the strict or broad sense, and no necessary or 
specific relationship to the security risk dynamics of 
‘cyber.’ as brookings institution senior Fellow peter 
W. singer stated in 2012:
about 31,300. that is roughly the 
number of magazine and journal 
articles written so far that discuss the 
phenomenon of cyber terrorism. Zero. 
that is the number of people that 
who (sic) been hurt or killed by cyber 
terrorism at the time this went to press. 
in many ways, cyber terrorism is like 
the Discovery Channel’s ‘shark Week,’ 
when we obsess about shark attacks 
despite the fact that you are roughly 
15,000 times more likely to be hurt or 
killed in an accident involving a toilet.3 
the ambiguity that cyberterrorism embodies provides 
a powerful rhetorical device that enables politicians 
and senior policy makers to engage in securitisation 
acts that potentially creates unwarranted—or 
misconstrued—responses to securing cyberspace, 
potentially resulting in the misdirection of national 
security and law enforcement resources. in 
consideration of this risk, cyberterrorism warrants 
appropriately structured and focussed analysis.
2       schmid, a.p. (2011). The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism 
Research, london, uK: routledge, p. 39.
3       singer, p.W. (2012). ‘the Cyber terror bogeyman’. Armed 
Services Journal, 12. available here: http://www.brookings.edu/
research/articles/2012/11/cyber-terror-singer
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The conceptual and definitional 
problem
at the core of the ambiguity regarding 
‘cyberterrorism’ are the misconceptions relating 
to its component terms: ‘terrorism’ and ‘cyber.’ 
First, terrorism is an ideologically and politically 
contested term. For every instance in which an 
act is appropriately described as terrorism, there 
are instances in which the term is deployed for 
political or ideological advantage. as young 
states, “generally speaking, for hundreds of years 
‘terrorism’ has been used as a pejorative term, 
usually applied to ‘the other side.’”4 as such, 
terrorism remains contested, ill-defined and difficult 
to objectively verify, a problem that has been 
exacerbated by the heightened sensitivities of the 
post-9/11 era. this absence of conceptual clarity 
makes effective analytical approaches to terrorism 
complex, as it does the development or refinement 
of related concepts.
second, the ‘cyber’ prefix is also problematic. it has 
come to be applied to a broad, emergent subset of 
security discourse; it lacks conceptual clarity and 
in many cases is simply inaccurate. the etymology 
of the word comprises distinct disparities across its 
current forms of usage, with reference to a number 
of security related issues tending to confound rather 
than clarify. as Ottis identifies:
in recent years the term ‘cyber’ has 
been used to describe almost anything 
that has to do with networks and 
computers, especially in the security 
field … including state-on-state cyber 
warfare, cyber terrorism, cyber militias 
etc. unfortunately, however, there is no 
consensus on what ‘cyberspace’ is, 
let alone what are the implications of 
conflicts in cyberspace.5 
4       young, r. (2006). ‘Defining terrorism: the evolution of 
terrorism as a legal Concept in international law and its influence 
on Definitions in Domestic legislation’. Boston College International 
and Comparative Law Review, 29((1), 23-105.
5       Ottis, r. and lorents, p. (2010). Cyberspace: Definition and 
implications‘. in proceedings of the 5th international Conference 
on information Warfare and security. Dayton, Oh, us: academic 
publishing limited, p 267-270. available here: https://docs.
google.com/file/d/0b7yq33gize8yOgy0MgywODetODViZi00yt
liltg5Zjytntc3nDZmOgFjnDVi/edit?usp=drive_web&urp=http://
conflictsincyberspace.blogspot.com.au/p/pub&pli=1&hl=en#
One of the earliest efforts to establish something 
akin to a definition of cyberterrorism can be seen 
in the work of Denning,6 who initially refers to the 
‘convergence of cyberspace and terrorism.’7 the 
simplicity of this approach is appealing, but it 
depends on what have just been demonstrated as 
contested and unclear terms. 
Predominant approaches to 
cyberterrorism
the increased focus of both government and of 
academia on matters pertaining to cyberspace 
and cybersecurity has led to an expanded body 
of literature that seeks to provide some degree 
of clarity on cyberterrorism. With this have come 
distinctions between different manifestations of a 
definitional convergence. this emerges, in part, 
from critical approaches by scholars specialising in 
terrorism research, and also from those researchers 
who have the technical capability to assess 
the plausibility of the scenarios that are often 
articulated as manifestations of cyberterrorism. the 
following identifies both the primary articulations of 
cyberterrorism and some of the shortcomings of 
these conceptualisations.
6       Denning, D.e. (2001). ‘activism, hacktivism, and 
Cyberterrorism: the internet as a tool for influencing Foreign policy. 
in arquilla, J. & ronfeldt, D. (eds.) Networks and Netwars: The 
Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy. santa Monica, usa: ranD 
Corporation, p. 239-288.
7       Ibid, 241.
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some of the earliest and most enduring articulations 
of cyberterrorist acts centre upon attacks on critical 
infrastructure.8 this particular variant of thinking in 
regards to cyberterrorism can be seen as a logical 
reflection of the ongoing convergence of the physical 
and virtual worlds, and the increased role that 
computer systems and computer networks play in 
managing, regulating and controlling systems that 
provide critical utilities and resources to citizens 
of advanced economies. in conjunction with a 
number of other drivers—such as the economically 
motivated advent of just-in-time inventory and the 
globalisation of production processes—social and 
economic infrastructure is portrayed as part of a 
fragile and vulnerable system. social survival is seen 
as increasingly reliant on this system, thus presenting 
an attractive target for a cyberterrorist. 
but there exists some key flaws in these apocalyptic 
scenarios, which envisage the total collapse or 
impairment of a society’s critical infrastructure. they 
are as much manifestations of the securitisation of 
cyberspace generally as they are a consequence 
of the failure to understand the potential reality of 
cyberterrorism. partly as a function of the types of 
scenario planning and horizon scanning exercises 
of the likes of Collin and Denning, and especially 
in the counterterrorism environment of post-9/11, 
much of the vulnerable critical infrastructure has 
been appropriately hardened for defensive purposes. 
by 2004, a range of government departments—in 
the united states, generally conceived of as both 
the most vulnerable and the most likely target—had 
taken defensive countermeasures in seeking to 
address vulnerabilities in their systems. additionally, 
a range of industry participants had also sought 
to minimise the likelihood of cyber-attacks on 
their assets.9 While recent cyber-attacks—such 
as stuxnet and its variants—suggest that it 
remains plausible to launch code-based attacks 
on infrastructure, the scale, cost, specificity and 
complexity of this incident10 makes it unlikely that a 
8       Collin, b. (1997). ‘the Future of Cyberterrorism. Crime 
and Justice international’, 13(2), 15–18. available: http://www.
cjimagazine.com/archives/cji4c18.html?id=415
9       shea, D.a. (2004). Critical Infrastructure: Control Systems and 
the Terrorist Threat. (Crs report rl31354).
10       sanger, D.e. (2012). ‘Olympic games‘. in Confront and 
Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American 
Power. new york, usa: Crown publishers, 188–225.
similar incident will be undertaken by a terrorist actor. 
Furthermore, it seems unlikely that even a successful 
cyberterrorist penetration of a critical infrastructure 
control system would achieve the types of objectives 
sought by terrorists. after applying a cost-benefit 
analysis approach to cyberterrorism, giacomello 
determined that “even for a well-funded terrorist 
organization cyberterrorism would not be a cost 
effective operation.”11 
the second approach to cyberterrorism focuses on 
terrorist use of cyberspace, primarily the internet. 
this approach considers the terrorist use of 
cyberspace as a safe haven and as a distributed 
command and control network. the proliferation 
and accessibility of terrorist literature presents a 
much higher return on investment than the highly 
specific and technical requirements required for 
critical infrastructure attack. additionally, use of 
cyberspace to distribute extremist literature and 
propaganda, and as a recruitment tool,12 provides 
longevity and sustainability to a terrorist movement 
while also enhancing the network’s resilience. 
if a comparison is undertaken of the costs and 
risks of operating physical training camps with 
the costs and risks of publishing al Qaeda in the 
arabian peninsula’s global jihadist magazine Inspire 
online, the use of cyberspace for propaganda and 
recruitment purposes clearly offers a more effective 
strategy. in some senses, this approach is linked to 
counterterrorism efforts. the destruction of physical 
training camps has forced terrorist actors—especially 
al-Qaeda—to move much of their operational 
efforts into cyberspace. it is important, however, 
to recognise that there is also a body of doctrinal 
work that underpins and supports these efforts, and 
al Qaeda in particular have sought to leverage the 
operational security benefits of networked structures 
and distributed command and control.13 
11       giacomello, g. (2004). ‘bangs for the buck: a Cost-
benefit analysis of Cyberterrorism’. Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, 27(5), 387-408. available here: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/10576100490483660
12       seib, p. and Janbek, D.M. (2011). Global Terrorism and the 
New Media: The Post-Al Qaeda Generation. london, gbr: routledge.
13       sageman, M. (2008). ‘terrorism in the age of the internet’. 
In Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. 
philadelphia, pa, usa: university of pennsylvania press, p. 109-124.
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Why are these not cyberterrorism?
both of these approaches to cyberterrorism suffer 
from problems, however. although cyber-attacks 
on critical infrastructure appear to be a reasonable 
description of something akin to cyberterrorism, 
there are a number of complicating factors. First, 
most critical infrastructure, and especially that which 
has been deemed to be crucial to the ongoing 
viability of the state, has been hardened and has 
protocols that seek to ensure any type of cyber-
attack is unlikely to be successful or cannot cause 
serious harm. Further to this, there is the reality 
that many attacks on these types of assets may 
be undertaken for other than political or ideological 
motivations, which are conditions necessary to 
qualify them as cyberterrorism attacks. the more 
serious threat is from well-resourced state actors 
rather than terrorists. the technical challenges 
required for a serious cyber-attack on critical 
infrastructure means that this form of cyberterrorism 
becomes an unlikely, if partly plausible, manifestation 
of the overall threat in cyberspace.
the second approach to conceptualising 
cyberterrorism—that of terrorist use of cyberspace 
for propaganda, recruitment, financing and other 
administrative-type objectives—struggles to be 
conceived of in any way as an act of cyberterrorism 
in and of itself. Inspire magazine in and of itself is 
not a terrorist incident. its title provides much of 
the requisite understanding for what its role is in 
the terrorist attack cycle. the attack inspired by 
the magazine’s content, or the attack sanctioned 
by email correspondence between terrorist group 
members and aspiring operatives are not terrorist 
attacks. the attacks themselves carry this title. the 
mere involvement or use of cyberspace or computer 
networks at some point in the attack cycle does not 
warrant use of the terminology of cyberterrorism, 
and if deployed to discuss these types of incidents, 
warrants scepticism as to the purpose of the use of 
the term. 
Conclusion: imagining 
cyberterrorism
in conclusion, much of the existing conceptualisation 
of cyberterrorism lacks adequate specificity or refers 
to tactics that lack adequate return on investment 
to be likely. so it is worthwhile, in much the same 
way that scholars and policy makers did in the 
early 1990s, to envisage an act that might warrant 
labelling as cyberterrorism. it is here that we can 
engage in a very brief horizon scanning exercise 
so as to provide guidance as to what potential 
manifestations of cyberterrorism may entail. 
by recalling some of the key characteristics of 
terrorism that were discussed at the outset, we 
can provide a useful and interesting framework 
through which to conceive future cyberterrorism. 
terrorism is, above all else, a communicative act. 
Violence used by terrorists is a means rather than 
an end. understanding that the violence traditionally 
considered as central to terrorism is instrumental 
allows us to focus instead on the objectives of 
terrorism: political or ideological outcomes. it is also 
useful to identify that schmid’s seminal chapter on 
defining terrorism identified a number of ‘contested 
elements,’ in which some respondents of the survey 
that informed the work were prepared to ‘label 
certain harmful acts (such as computer hacking) 
terrorism even when no direct violence is involved or 
no terror results’.14 
14      schmid, The Routledge Handbook...Ibid, pg.84
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it is worthwhile citing an analogy from current 
events. edward snowden has successfully 
altered the dynamics of much of the intelligence-
gathering practices of the united states intelligence 
community. he has also impacted the relationship 
between national governments and, consequently, 
initiated broad public debate about intelligence 
practices, intelligence collection and general 
oversight and accountability. he has achieved this 
political or ideological objective without detonating 
an explosive device, without firing a weapon, 
and without engaging in anything that could be 
generally constituted as violence. it could plausibly 
be argued that had he used the types of tactics 
that a conventional terrorist organisation would 
have used—such as a car bomb—any form of 
political discourse regarding the nsa’s intelligence 
collection programs would have failed. it is likely 
that such an attack would have provided sufficient 
political basis for an expansion of the programs in 
place. by not engaging in conventional violence, 
but by using cyber capabilities and targeting 
cyber assets—data—edward snowden was able 
to achieve something in regards to what we can 
deduce to be his political or ideological objectives. 
this is perhaps the prototypical example of future 
‘cyberterrorism.’ stealing, corruption, or destruction 
of data may prove to be a much more effective, 
low-cost mechanism of coercion that in a further 
converged world is able to instil ‘fear, dread, panic 
or mere anxiety.’15 the implications of this kind of 
attack would be multifaceted and far-reaching, 
with significant ramifications for numerous aspects 
of modern life. the capacity to alter significantly 
individuals’ capacities to go about daily life, or to 
undertake rudimentary essential tasks, or to erase or 
corrupt their digital existence can only become more 
terrifying as modern society continues to integrate 
the virtual world into the physical. perhaps a future 
that contains cyberterrorism, with data as a target, is 
more plausible than initially conceived. 
15      schmid, Ibid, p. 86
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